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NOW THAT THE COURTS HAVE BEATEN 
CONGRESS TO THE PUNCH, WHY IS 
CONGRESS STILL PUNCHING THE 
PATENT SYSTEM? 
Robert A. Armitage* †
Introduction 
The U.S. House of Representatives began September by passing the Pat-
ent Reform Act of 2007. This bill, if enacted, would make major changes to 
U.S. patent law. Given the universally recognized need for improvements to 
the U.S. patent system, passing a patent reform bill in the House should 
have been easy. It was not. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 made it through 
the House only after a spirited debate. There were a host of complaints by 
House members that the bill was not ready for floor action. In the end, it 
passed the House by a relatively narrow margin, 220 members voting for the 
bill and 175 members voting against. 
What made for such tough congressional sledding? 
I. Dueling Agendas for Patent Reform 
The bill is controversial because it mostly reflects the wish list of a sin-
gle-minded coalition of interests. The bill’s supporters allege that the 
enforcement of many U.S. patents is no less than lawsuit abuse. The core 
supporters of the House bill responded to these allegations with provisions 
to limit the damages available to patent owners, to restrict the judicial ven-
ues available for patent enforcement actions, and to provide additional non-
judicial forums for deciding patent validity. In other words, the House saw 
the case for patent reform as largely one for tried and true tort reform. Un-
derstandably, many patent owners do not see the House action as a reform of 
the patent system at all, but rather as a concerted effort to diminish it. 
The contrary views of what is and is not needed patent reform come 
from a diverse set of constituencies. Those opposed to the path taken in the 
House bill range from bar associations (the Intellectual Property Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association and the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association) to trade associations (the National Association of Manu-
facturers and the Biotechnology Industry Association). Those leading the 
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opposition to the House bill are among the strongest supporters of an alter-
native set of patent reform measures—the April 2004 recommendations of 
the National Academy of Sciences. 
The National Academy, after an intensive, four-year study of the U.S. 
patent system, recommended patent reforms that would remove highly sub-
jective elements from the U.S. patent law–and the expense, unpredictability, 
and uncertainty that those elements inject into the patent system. Other Na-
tional Academy reform recommendations would permit a patent’s validity to 
be readily determined from publicly accessible information–again eliminat-
ing more of the expense, unpredictability and uncertainty that uniquely 
plague U.S. patent law. By any reckoning, the National Academy recom-
mendations—although they would substantially rework fundamental aspects 
of the operation of U.S. patent law—struck a careful balance between the 
interests of those seeking to enforce valid patents and those seeking to chal-
lenge questionable ones. 
Supporters of the National Academy recommendations accepted the 
Academy’s core findings. The Academy found that the effectiveness of the 
U.S. patent system is impaired in large measure because quirks of our do-
mestic patent system make it uniquely costly and complicated to use; it also 
found that it is time to jettison antiquated patent law principles that are in 
use here but nowhere else in the world. These supporters, thus, see compre-
hensive patent reforms as having the potential to greatly improve the quality 
of issued patents and the ease of assessing a patent’s validity. The reforms 
may also ensure that enforcing a patent in court could never be credibly 
termed an act of lawsuit abuse. 
The House bill, however, simply bypassed the National Academy’s rec-
ommendations for a more transparent and objective U.S. patent law. The 
House punted on the core recommendation of the National Academy to 
place U.S. patent law principles in greater harmony with concepts present in 
every other country around the world. It postponed implementation of the 
most important of these harmonizing measures: introduction of the first-
inventor-to-file principle. In the fine print in the transition provisions of the 
bill, the implementation of this principle was put off to the distant date when 
European countries have ratified a new version of the European Patent Con-
vention containing a so-called “grace period”!  
The National Academy’s recommendation to remove all of the highly 
subjective factors from U.S. patent law was also left unrealized. The House 
declined to take steps needed to limit the most important of these subjective 
elements, the defense to the enforceability of a patent based upon allega-
tions of so-called “inequitable conduct.” This defense in recent years has 
denied patent owners the right to enforce otherwise valid and infringed pat-
ents because of little more than “technical fouls” committed during patent 
procurement. The bad conduct that can trigger loss of enforceability can be 
nothing more than a misstatement or incomplete statement made to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office in a patent application, even if 
this conduct made no difference to the decision to grant the patent.  
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Starting soon after the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, a number of 
specific contentions have provided grist for these anti-troll gripes. For ex-
ample, looking back to the 1980s and 1990s, anti-patent forces asserted that 
juries had too much leeway in deciding what a patent covers. Every patent 
includes one or more “claims” that must lay out with definiteness and par-
ticularity what subject matter is legally protectable and what is not. When 
deciding what a patent covers, anti-patent forces contended that juries were 
As the bill reached the floor, the House approved an amendment that es-
sentially rejected the National Academy’s recommendation to eliminate the 
“inequitable conduct” defense. The current bill codifies a broad reach for the 
“inequitable conduct” doctrine—one that would render the U.S. patent stat-
ute unique in the world in affording a defense of this type to infringers of 
valid patents.  
On the “inequitable conduct” issue alone, the House bill sets a precedent 
that could have dire international consequences for U.S. interests. Should 
other countries incorporate a similar provision into their patent laws, this 
could subject foreign patents of U.S. inventors to all manner of new unen-
forceability assertions. This is an especially troublesome prospect for U.S. 
interests in countries that stand to benefit more by inexpensively copying 
U.S. technology than by respecting and protecting U.S.-origin intellectual 
property rights.  
II. “Trolls” Versus “Anti-Trolls”: The Lawsuit Abuse
Agenda Examined 
What led the U.S. House of Representatives to ignore broadly supported 
calls for needed reforms to U.S. patent law that were laid out by the Na-
tional Academy in a set of compelling, well-reasoned recommendations? 
Are the aforementioned “lawsuit abuse” allegations so persuasive that they 
justify Congress enacting legislation that many believe represents a devas-
tating retreat from decades of consistent U.S. support for strong and 
effective patent laws—and may have highly undesirable consequences for 
U.S. innovators seeking to profit from their innovations in markets outside 
the United States?  
One answer is that supporters of the House-passed bill have thus far 
successfully advanced the case that something must be done about “trolls” 
who own patents and the patent plaintiffs’ bar willing to take trolls’ cases 
into court. Trolls are patent owners whose business is based at least in part 
on acquiring patents from others to generate licensing income or, failing 
that, to collect damages based upon infringement of the acquired patents. 
Even though trolls may merely be exercising a right to compensation for 
infringement of valid patents, an anti-troll constituency argues that the troll 
business model is viable in part because patent litigation unfairly disadvan-
tages accused patent infringers and unfairly advantages patent owners. 
These disadvantages arise in large measure, so they assert, because the fed-
eral courts’ patent jurisprudence excessively rewards inventors and makes it 
too difficult to invalidate questionable patents. 
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The anti-trolls additionally complain that compensatory damages in 
many patent cases are often vastly more than merely compensatory. Under 
the anti-troll worldview, compensatory damages have been based upon the 
entire value of an infringing product even if the value attributable to the in-
vention relates only to a single aspect or component of the product. This 
means, again under the anti-troll worldview, that infringers have been forced 
to pay grossly excessive damages. The threat of runaway damages, the anti-
trolls believe, has forced extravagant settlements of patent lawsuits (Re-
search in Motion, over $612 million in 2006 to settle BlackBerry 
too easily swayed in their determination of what a patent claim means and 
they routinely gave patent owners the benefit of the doubt. 
The anti-patent constituency throughout the 1990s also asserted that in-
ventors could too easily expand the reach of patents to include all manner of 
“equivalents” to what the patent actually discloses and claims as the inven-
tion. Patent owners, these anti-patent forces contended, could readily and 
unfairly extend the reach of their patents beyond anything the patent laid out 
as the true invention because the courts sanctioned a far too liberal applica-
tion of the “doctrine of equivalents.” 
By the start of the current decade, anti-troll forces were focused on op-
timizing their leverage against patent owners in order to force them to settle 
patent infringement claims on favorable terms. They began the cry that pat-
ent owners had undue leverage in such settlement discussions on account of 
the threat of injunctions that could shut down an accused infringer’s busi-
ness. According to anti-trolls, the injunctive threat existed even in cases 
where the equities favor the accused infringer and counsel for denying the 
patent owner this extraordinary relief. The courts, they asserted, simply 
failed to undertake the type of equitable inquiry that should balance, among 
other equitable factors, the hardships between property owners and infring-
ers. 
Additionally, anti-trolls have long argued that patents are far too easy to 
get. The United States Patent and Trademark Office does not–under the anti-
troll view of the world–adequately prevent the patenting of obvious discov-
eries. Anti-trolls have stated that courts also sustain too many patents that 
provide no more than trivial advances in technology. Anti-trolls believe that 
the “non-obviousness” requirement put into the patent statute in 1952 effec-
tively has been read out of the statute (or at least marginalized) by the 
arbitrary judicial requirements that patents must be sustained unless there is 
a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation that would have inevitably led 
skilled persons to the invention. 
Another unfair leverage point for patent owners that has appeared in the 
anti-trolls’ litany is the alleged ease of pursuing punitive damage claims by 
asserting that the infringement of the patent was willful. Anti-trolls have 
argued that the “duty of due care” imposed by the courts on accused infring-
ers has placed enormous obligations on them to avoid being tarred as 
willful. Anti-trolls have asserted that in many situations this can require the 
infringer to obtain an exculpatory opinion from patent counsel before com-
mencing any allegedly infringing activity. 
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In April 2007, the Supreme Court bolstered the standards for application 
of the non-obviousness requirement in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 
The Court cast aside any mechanical application of a much-maligned 
“teaching-suggestion-motivation” threshold test for assessing non-
obviousness. It then provided an analytical framework for non-obviousness 
infringement claims) and has produced huge jury awards (Microsoft, $1.5 
billion verdict in 2007 on MP3-related patents incorporated into its Win-
dows OS). 
III. The Courts Have Beaten Congress to the Punch in
Addressing the Anti-Trolls’ Anti-Patent Agenda 
While the foregoing indictment of the work of the courts in patent cases 
could hardly be more pervasive, do these allegations justify the House bill’s 
reworking the patent statute to the benefit of the anti-trolls? The answer to 
this question is, of course, a resounding “no.” The courts have done—or are 
ably doing—everything that needs to be done to address the foregoing alle-
gations of a runaway, pro-troll U.S. patent law.  
What has happened over the past decade with respect to allegedly unfair 
treatment of patent infringers? Quite simply, the two courts with the greatest 
influence on the interpretation of U.S. patent law, the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court—with help from clear-thinking district court judges—have 
squarely addressed and redressed each allegation of tilting towards trolls. 
More remarkably, the courts have done so promptly and decisively. The fed-
eral courts, when presented with a cogent allegation of an unfair pro-troll 
tilt, have found appropriate judicial vehicles to redress the concern. The re-
cord of the past decade speaks for itself. 
In the 1996 case Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., the Supreme 
Court affirmed an opinion of the Federal Circuit that the construction of 
claims in a patent case is not an issue that can go to the jury, but rather is 
reserved for the judges before whom the patent case is heard. This brought a 
categorical end to any concern that juries might be favoring patent owners 
and incorrectly crediting patent owners’ errant contentions about the full 
reach of the patent’s claims. 
The Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co. laid down stringent rules for the application of the 
“doctrine of equivalents” in patent cases. In the years since Festo, the con-
cern that patent owners could benefit from an elastic reading of their claims 
that routinely extended to cover alleged “equivalents” has disappeared in its 
entirety. 
In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, the Supreme Court took on 
the contention that the threat of injunctive relief was driving unreasonable 
and unwarranted settlements in patent cases. It reiterated that injunctions 
could issue only when equity required that such extraordinary relief be 
granted, casting aside the supposed Federal Circuit’s rule in patent cases 
that, absent exceptional circumstances, injunctions should issue once in-
fringement of a valid patent has been established. 
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Alternatively, Congress can do what the National Academy of Sciences 
and many other important constituencies have recommended—advance 
determinations designed to assure that patents will not be sustained on triv-
ial differences from existing technology. Thus, when a patent is found valid 
today, an infringer can quibble little with the conclusion that it misappropri-
ated a truly non-obvious discovery of the inventor. 
In an August 2007 decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the en 
banc Federal Circuit removed the specter that the threat of punitive damages 
could force accused infringers into unfair settlements of patent infringement 
allegations. It eliminated the longstanding “duty of due care” to avoid the 
knowing infringement of valid patents. Rejecting any inquiry into the sub-
jective beliefs of the infringer, the court sharply limited any future findings 
of willful infringement (and enhanced damages based thereon) absent clear 
and convincing evidence that the infringer’s actions were objectively unrea-
sonable. 
Finally, and most significantly, the baseless nature of the concern that 
trolls somehow take home unwarranted damages in patent cases is best ex-
emplified by Judge Rudi M. Brewster’s decisive action in Lucent 
Technologies Inc. v. Gateway Inc., a case in the Southern District of Califor-
nia. Following a May 2007 jury verdict in favor of the patent owner Lucent, 
Judge Brewster initially ordered the infringers to pay $1.53 billion in dam-
ages for infringement of two patents. However, merely three months later, 
Judge Brewster vacated the verdict after finding the jury lacked sufficient 
evidence to award damages based upon the entire market value of the in-
fringing product. The anti-troll constituency pressed its case in Congress for 
amendments to the patent statute restricting compensatory damages—even 
though Judge Brewster was able to apply existing law, without any congres-
sional intervention, to address oversized damages through a routine post-
trial motion. 
This remarkable string of judicial decisions over the past decade leads to 
an inescapable conclusion: time after time, the alleged abuses or excesses 
cited by the anti-trolls have not required a congressional fix. The consistent, 
winning formula for the anti-trolls has been to take a meritorious case into 
court and win on the merits—under the existing patent statute. 
IV. The Easy Choice Is the Right Choice for Congress
What are the issues that the 110th Congress should tackle if its objective 
is true reform of U.S. patent law? Given the long history of judicial respon-
siveness on each of the above “lawsuit abuse” allegations, Congress should 
have an easy choice.  
On one hand, Congress could kowtow to the anti-troll constituency that 
incorrectly sees today’s patent law as being tilted to favor owners of patents. 
It could attempt to rewrite patent law to favor infringers, notwithstanding 
what the courts have done magnificently over the past decade to fairly and 
decisively address allegations of overreaching by patent owners and lax ap-
plication of existing standards for patenting. 
2007] Now That the Courts Have Beaten Congress to the Punch 49 
much needed reforms that will produce greater harmony and objectivity in 
the patent law. Specifically, Congress could enact broadly supported meas-
ures that would provide patent owners and patent challengers alike the 
benefits of the best ideas from the best patent systems in operation around 
the world. 
Conclusion 
Since U.S. global competitiveness depends on international respect for 
IP rights of U.S.-based inventors, Congress should be given every encour-
agement to make the right choice, especially given that the right choice 
would appear to be such an easy one. 
